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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20070325-SC 
Case No. 20041095-CA 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON : 
Petitioner/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari review and has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002). See Order in Addendum A. 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, 157 P.3d 809 is in Addendum B. 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF REVIEW, 
PRESERVATION 
Issue. This Court granted certiorari review as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals correctly construed statutory provisions governing 
the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
Standard of review. This Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness. See In re A.T.. 2001 UT 82, [^5, 34 P.3d 228. The court of appeals correctly 
applied a correctness standard of review to the underlying issue. See Anderson, 2007 UT 
App 68,114, 157P.3d809. 
Preservation. The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the trial court 
had the authority to impose consecutive sentences following probation revocation. See 
idat1fl[6-l4. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The texts of the following statutes are in Addendum C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After being charged by Information filed on January 15, 2003, Petitioner pleaded 
guilty to a reduced charge of theft, a third degree felony. R. 2-3, 66; 55:1, 6, 9. On 
December 4, 2003, Judge Noel sentenced Anderson to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, but suspended the prison term and placed Mr. 
Anderson on probation for 18 months to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole 
("AP&P"). R. 66-67; 55:14-15. Although the sentence was activated and acted upon, the 
trial court did not sign and enter the judgment into the record until after appellate counsel 
requested a copy of the judgment on May 31, 2005. See Supplemental Record. 
On December 6, 2004, following an order to show cause hearing, Judge Reese, 
who had replaced Judge Noel, increased Anderson's sentence by ordering that it be 
served consecutively with a sentence imposed by Judge Atherton. R. 42-43, 55:19. 
Anderson timely appealed. 
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A majority of the court of appeals held that Judge Reese had the authority to 
impose consecutive sentences following probation revocation. Anderson, 2007 UT App 
68, W5-14. The dissent disagreed, concluding that following probation revocation, the 
trial court was "limited to executing the sentence previously imposed." Id. at ^18 (Davis, 
J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed out that the majority decision was not consistent 
with the court of appeals decision in Salt Lake City v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, 156 
P.3d 839. Id, at If 19 (Davis, J., dissenting). See Addendum D 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After Anderson pled guilty to third degree felony theft, Judge Noel sentenced him 
on December 5, 2003, to serve zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. R. 66; 55:14-
15. The judge suspended the prison term and placed Anderson on probation, to be 
supervised by AP&P. R. 67; 55:14-15. Subsequently, on August 16, 2004, Anderson 
pleaded guilty to two first degree felony counts in front of Judge Atherton. See 
Addendum E.1 Judge Atherton sentenced Petitioner on August 16, 2004, to serve two 
terms of six years to life at the Utah State Prison. See Addendum F. She ordered that the 
two terms be served concurrently, and did not stay imposition; accordingly, pursuant to 
Judge Atherton's sentence, Anderson began serving time at the Utah State Prison. See 
Addendum F. 
Because Judge Atherton's judgment in the intervening case, Third District Court case 
number 041901010, impacts significantly on the decision in this case, Petitioner asked 
the court of appeals and now this Court to take judicial notice under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 201 of the trial court docket and judgment in that case. The docket is in 
Addendum E and the judgment is in Addendum F. 
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On December 6, 20045 Judge Reese, who had replaced Judge Noel, held an order 
to show cause hearing based on a claim that Anderson had violated probation by 
committing an aggravated robbery and possessing a firearm. R. 42; 55:17. Anderson 
admitted the allegations. R. 31; 55:17, 18. Judge Reese revoked Anderson's probation 
and over defense counsel's objection, ordered that the prison sentence in this case run 
consecutively with the aggravated robbery sentences in Judge Atherton's case. R. 42-43; 
55:19. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah's statutory scheme, the decision to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences must be made at the time of sentencing. The consecutive or concurrent 
sentencing decision is a component of the imposition of sentence. Once the decision to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences has been stated on the record and indicated 
in the judgment, a trial court loses jurisdiction to amend the sentence and statutorily 
retains only limited jurisdiction to oversee probation. Although a trial court retains 
limited jurisdiction over probationers, it does not have jurisdiction to resentence a 
defendant or make the consecutive/concurrent decision following probation revocation. 
Rather, upon revocation of probation, a trial court is mandated to execute the sentence 
previously imposed. The requirement of making the consecutive or concurrent 
sentencing decision at the time of sentencing is consistent with other Utah statutes and 
the final judgment rule. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. TRIAL COURTS CANNOT IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES FOLLOWING PROBATION REVOCATION UNDER 
UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME. 
Under Utah's statutory scheme, a trial court must make the consecutive or 
concurrent sentencing decision when a defendant is sentenced and judgment is entered. 
Utah's statutory scheme allows a trial court to retain limited jurisdiction to oversee 
probation and to execute a previously imposed sentence if a defendant subsequently 
violates probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(iii)(2003). Utah's statutory 
scheme does not, however, allow a trial court to impose consecutive sentences for the 
first time following probation revocation. The decision of the majority below should 
therefore be overturned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (2003) governs the imposition of consecutive or 
concurrent sentences. It states in part: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively 
to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or 
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already 
serving. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1) (emphasis added). 
Section 76-3-401(1) requires a judge to decide whether to impose consecutive or 
concurrent sentences "if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
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offense[.]" Id. The plain language of the statute further requires that this decision be 
stated on the record and included in the judgment and commitment. The two sentences in 
subsection (1), when read together, contemplate that the consecutive or concurrent 
sentencing decision will be made at the time of sentencing. Id 
Requiring the consecutive or concurrent sentencing decision to be made at the 
time of sentencing is consistent with other Utah statutes and Utah criminal procedure. 
Final judgment is entered in a criminal case when the judge imposes sentence and enters 
judgment. State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, f 10 n. 1; 98 P.3d 46 (reversed on other 
grounds, 128 P.3d 1199); State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, f l , 57 P.3d 1065 ("In a 
criminal case, it is 'the sentence its elf which constitutes a final judgment from which 
appellant has the right to appeal."5 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). 
After the trial court enters a final judgment, it loses jurisdiction to amend the 
sentence. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (further 
citations omitted) ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case.5'). The court of appeals has recognized that a judgment is final 
at sentencing unless the trial court has not entered judgment and has made it clear to the 
defendant that the orally imposed sentence is not final. See e.g. State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 
1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In cases where the trial court makes it clear to a criminal defendant that it is not entering 
final judgment, imposing a consecutive sentencing order when sentence and judgment are 
subsequently entered does not disturb a defendant's expectation as to the finality of the 
sentence and is consistent with Utah's statutory scheme. On the other hand, allowing a 
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trial court to reimpose sentence after having already done so precludes a criminal 
defendant from relying on the finality of the judgment and disregards the requirement of 
section 76-3-401(1) that the consecutive sentencing order be stated on the record and 
included in the judgment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). 
Because the time for filing an appeal begins to run at the time sentence is imposed 
and judgment entered, the logical time for imposing a consecutive or concurrent 
sentencing order is at the time of sentencing. In fact, allowing a trial court to 
subsequently increase sentence after judgment is entered would disturb the finality of a 
judgment and inject uncertainty into the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the 
legislature required, pursuant to section 76-3-401, that the consecutive sentencing 
decision be made at the time sentence is imposed and included in the final judgment. See 
idL 
Although final judgment occurs in a criminal case when a trial court imposes 
sentence and enters judgment, a trial court retains limited jurisdiction to oversee 
probation under Utah's statutory scheme. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2)(a). Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) states in part, cc[o]n a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, 
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation." Id. 
(emphasis added). This language demonstrates that sentence is imposed at the time of 
sentencing, prior to placing a defendant on probation, but that the execution of the 
sentence can thereafter be suspended while the defendant is on probation. 
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While section 77-18-l(2)(b)(iii) expressly provides trial courts with "continuing 
jurisdiction over all probationers," it does not disturb the final judgment rule. In fact, the 
statute indicates that while a trial court has jurisdiction to oversee probation, it does not 
have jurisdiction to resentence a defendant. Instead, when a defendant has been 
previously sentenced, upon revocation of probation the statute mandates that a "sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed." Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(12)(e) (iii). Although 
the statute also allows for a defendant to be "sentenced" upon revocation, it does not 
allow for "resentencing" and instead clearly states that "[i]f probation is revoked, . . . the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed." Id. 
Other portions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 demonstrate that sentence is imposed 
at the sentencing hearing prior to probation, and a defendant cannot subsequently be 
resentenced following probation revocation. For example, the statute contemplates that 
information about the defendant will be given to the judge at the time sentencing is 
imposed, not later, at a probation revocation proceeding. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
(5), (6) & (7). The statute allows the trial court, "[p]rior to imposition of any sentence," 
to "continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the 
purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report. . . or information from other 
2
 The court of appeals suggests that "the 'shall be sentenced' language appears to have 
been inadvertently retained by the legislature when it amended section 77-18-l(2)(a) to 
remove the suggestion that a trial court could place a defendant on probation without a 
sentence and suspend the sentencing decision until probation was revoked." Salt Lake 
City v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32,1[12 n.l, 156 P.3d 839. Regardless of whether this is 
correct, section 77-18-1 (12)(e) nevertheless requires that in circumstances where 
sentence has previously been imposed, a trial court is limited to executing the previously 
imposed sentence. 
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sources about the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a). The presentence report 
must be provided to defense counsel "three working days prior to sentencing" and a 
defendant must bring inaccuracies to the attention of the sentencing judge, and waives a 
challenge to the inaccuracies if he does not do so. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) & (b). 
This portion of section 77-18-1 therefore contemplates that sentence is imposed when 
judgment is entered and prior to probation. See also Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 (7) ("At 
the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence."). Because a consecutive sentencing order is part of sentencing, that order 
would necessarily be entered at the same time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(requiring that when ua defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense," the trial court "shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment" whether the trial court imposes consecutive or concurrent 
sentences.) 
The court of appeals recognized in Jaramillo that Utah's statutory scheme requires 
that the consecutive or concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and not 
following probation violation. Salt Lake City v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, [^16, 156 
P.3d 839. Because the "power to grant, modify or revoke probation is purely statutory," 
the Jaramillo court first looked to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 in determining whether the 
consecutive sentencing decision could be made following probation revocation. Id. at 
TJ12. That statute "distinguishes between imposing sentence,' which is a necessary 
prerequisite to probation, and 'the execution of the sentence.'" Id. at [^13 (citing Utah 
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Code Ann. §77-18-1 (2)(a)). Accordingly, the court focused on whether imposition of 
concurrent or consecutive sentencing was a function of the imposition of sentence, or a 
function of the execution sentence. Id. Since "Utah's sentencing statutes clearly indicate 
that the concurrent or consecutive determination must be imposed as a component of the 
sentence itself[,]" the Jaramillo court concluded that Utah's statutory scheme required 
that the decision be made at sentencing. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, f 13 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. §§76-3-201(2)(d) (Supp. 2006) and 76-3-401 (2003)). 
As the Jaramillo court noted, Utah's sentencing statutes further demonstrate that 
the consecutive sentencing decision must be made at the time of sentencing and not 
following probation revocation. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, ffl|13-14. The court found 
section 76-3-401 "particularly instructive" because "the terminology employed 
throughout the section indicates [ ] the concurrent or consecutive determination is one 
that must be made and imposed at the time of sentencing." Id. at ^[14. The court pointed 
out that section 76-3-401 "states that '[a] court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses.'" Id. (quoting section 76-3-401(1) (emphasis in 
original)). The use of the word "impose" coupled with the remaining context was 
significant to the Jaramillo court, demonstrating that the consecutive or concurrent 
sentencing decision necessary under section 76-3-401 is a component of the imposition of 
sentence. Id. 
The Jaramillo court also found it significant that the statute allows the Board of 
Pardons to request clarification from the trial court if the order does not state whether 
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multiple sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently. Jaramillo, 2007 UT 
App 32, Tfl4. In fact, the statute makes clear that the trial court cannot make the decision 
following the request for clarification and is instead limited to clarifying its previous 
sentencing order. See id. (citing Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401 (1)). As the Jaramillo court 
acknowledged, "[t]his emphasis on clarification of the original commitment order 
indicates that the concurrent or consecutive decision must be made at the time of 
sentencing and may not be decided at some later date." Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, ^jl4. 
The fact that a judge must consider certain statutory factors before imposing 
consecutive sentences further demonstrates that the consecutive or concurrent sentencing 
decision must be made at the time of sentencing. Id, at ^15. As the Jaramillo court 
noted, "[t]he requirement that the consecutive/concurrent decision be made at the time of 
sentencing gives the trial court, the State and defendants a fixed point in time at which to 
evaluate the statutory factors." Id, This is also consistent with the requirement of section 
77-18-1 that information which bears on the statutory factors specific to the defendant be 
given to the trial court prior to the imposition of sentence. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
18-l(5)(a)-(7). 
Although the court of appeals held in Jaramillo that the consecutive sentencing 
determination must be made at the time of sentencing, the majority reached a different 
decision in this case. In Anderson, the majority focused on Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401 
and the language of subsection (l)(b), which allows a trial court to order that sentences 
run concurrently or consecutively "with any other sentences the defendant is already 
serving" as the key to resolving the issue of whether a trial court may impose consecutive 
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sentences following a probation revocation. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, [^6 (emphasis in 
original). The majority concluded that a sentence of probation is not a sentence that is 
being served, and a sentence must be for incarceration in order to qualify as a "sentence^ 
the defendant is already serving" under section 76-3-401(l)(b). IcL Because, according 
to the majority, section 76-3-40l(l)(b) allows a trial court to impose consecutive 
sentences only if the defendant has been incarcerated on other charges, the majority 
concluded that Judge Atherton could not have ordered Anderson's sentences in the case 
before her to run consecutively with the sentence in this case since Anderson was still on 
probation in this case when Judge Atherton sentenced him. Id. at ^[11. Consequently, the 
majority decided that Judge Reese was required to make the concurrent/consecutive 
determination following probation revocation. Id. at ^ [14 
As the dissent recognized, however, the majority improperly concluded that 
probation is not a sentence. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, [^22 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
Citing support from federal law, Utah law and the plain meaning of the term as defined 
by the dictionary, the dissent recognized that "probation is a sentence within the meaning 
of section 76-3-401(1 )(b), and is still a sentence being served even though that service 
may occur outside of jail or prison." Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 
2006)) (stating "a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: . . .(c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law . . .[or] (d) to imprisonment"); 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2000) ("A 
defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to a term of 
probation . . ."); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 43 n.3 (1994) (discussing the 
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which "classified probation as a sentence55); United 
States v. Mueller, 463 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating "instead of representing the 
suspension of the execution of a sentence, probation constitutes a type of sentence in and 
of itself5); Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (7th ed. 1999) (defining probation as a "court 
imposed criminal sentence55)). 
The majority's attempt to support its decision by indicating that statutory 
construction of section 76-3-401 necessitates interpreting the legislature's use of "already 
serving55 as meaning incarcerated is not supported by the language of the statute. The 
majority thought that the term "already serving55 used in section (l)(b), rather than "has 
already been sentenced,55 as used in section (7)(c) "should be taken note of and its 
omission in subsection 1(b) should be interpreted as purposeful.55 Anderson, 2007 UT 
App 68, j^lO. But the distinction the majority makes between the word choice in the two 
subsections is a distinction without a difference. In both cases, the statute refers to a 
sentence that has been imposed without requiring that the sentence include incarceration. 
In fact, had the legislature intended to allow the imposition of consecutive sentences in 
only those circumstances where a defendant has been incarcerated on a previous 
sentence, it could have used the word "imprisoned55 which it made special efforts to 
define in subsection (12). When the statute is read as a whole, it is apparent that the word 
"sentence55 is used to refer to a sentence imposed at the time of judgment, regardless of 
whether that sentence includes probation, and the more precisely defined word 
"imprisoned55 is used to refer specifically to circumstances where a defendant has been 
incarcerated. 
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Moreover, defining a sentence already being served as being only a sentence of 
incarceration would lead to "illogical results." Id, at }^24 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
[A] sentence that includes jail time as a condition of probation would 
implicate section 76-3-401(l)(b), but a sentence of probation with other 
conditions would not. It makes no sense that the almost infinite variations 
of probation would not implicate section 76-3-401(1 )(b), while a sentence 
for the same crime that does include some form of incarceration would 
implicate the statute. Thus under the majority approach, it is difficult to 
know under just what circumstances section 76-3-401(l)(b) would be 
implicated: A sentence that includes community service? A sentence of 
confinement with work release? A sentence of confinement to jail and not 
the Utah state prison? 
Id. at *|24 (Davis, J. dissenting). 
Although probation is a sentence, the majority relied on its questionable 
conclusion otherwise then took a leap and concluded, without further analysis, that since 
Judge Atherton could not order that her sentence run consecutively with Anderson's 
sentence of probation, "the circumstances presented to Judge Reese required him to make 
the concurrent/consecutive determination at the probation revocation hearing in which he 
sought to impose and execute the previously suspended sentence." Id. at }^14. Noticeably 
absent from the majority's analysis in reaching this conclusion, is any discussion of the 
language at the beginning of section 76-3-401(1) which requires a trial court to 
determine, when a person is adjudged guilty, whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively, to state that determination on the record, and to indicate the determination 
in the order of judgment and commitment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). Nor is 
there a discussion of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2) which allows a trial court to place a 
defendant on probation, and gives trial courts only continued limited jurisdiction over 
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probation but not to resentence a defendant. Additionally, the majority did not 
acknowledge the language of section 77-18-1 (12)(e) which allows execution of a 
previously imposed sentence, but does not provide a judge overseeing probation with the 
authority to resentence a defendant following probation violation. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1. 
In addition, the majority did not acknowledge that under Utah's statutory scheme, 
final judgment is entered when a trial court orally imposes sentence and enters judgment, 
or discuss the double jeopardy implications of amending a final judgment to impose a 
harsher sentence following a probation violation. See generally Nelson v. State, 617 
P.2d 502 (Alaska 1981) (an increased sentence following probation violation violates 
double jeopardy). Instead, the majority seemed to conclude that because Judge Atherton 
could not order that her sentences run consecutively with Anderson's probationary 
sentence, Judge Reese must have been able to do so following probation revocation. See 
Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, ffif 12-14. 
The majority's conclusion that a trial court cannot impose consecutive sentences if 
the other sentence involves probation is contrary to its analysis in Jaramillo as well as the 
practice in many Utah trial courts. In fact, as is evident from the court of appeals' 
decision in Bird v. State, 2000 UT App 209 (unpublished), trial courts can and do order 
that a sentence be served with a previously imposed sentence of probation. In Bird, the 
Compare, Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32 at [^15 (considering it noteworthy - and 
apparently improper- that the trial court in that case imposed consecutive sentences 
following probation revocation based in part of the probation violation). 
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court of appeals held that the trial court had properly required that a subsequent sentence 
be served with a previously imposed sentence of probation. Id. Hence, Bird shows that 
the practice of imposing consecutive sentences when at least one of the sentences is 
probation has been followed in Utah since at least 2000, does not pose implementation 
problems, and has been upheld on appeal. Id. See Addendum G 
To avoid the application of its previous holding that consecutive sentences cannot 
be imposed following probation revocation, the majority unsuccessfully attempted to 
distinguish the facts in this case from those in Jaramillo. See Anderson, 2007 UT App 
68, ^14 n.7. First, the majority suggested that Jaramillo was different because the judge 
failed to order consecutive or concurrent sentencing "for the two misdemeanor 
convictions before the trial court at the initial sentencing" whereas the judges in this case 
were not able to order consecutive or concurrent sentencing because at the time of the 
initial sentencing, "Defendant was not yet serving another sentence." Id As previously 
outlined, however, the majority's conclusion that Anderson "was not yet serving another 
sentence" was incorrect under Utah statutory and case law. 
Second, the majority attempted to distinguish Jaramillo by pointing out that 
the sentences in this case were imposed by two different judges at two different hearings 
whereas the sentences in Jaramillo were imposed by a single judge at the initial 
sentencing hearing. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, ^ 14 n. 7. According to the majority, 
because Anderson is governed by subsection 1(b) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 and 
Jaramillo was governed by 1(a), the holding in Jaramillo that a consecutive sentencing 
order must be imposed at the time of the initial sentencing does not control. This 
16 
reasoning is flawed, however, because both subsections are governed by section (1) of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 which addresses the timing for making the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision. By contrast, subsections (a) and (b) do not 
address the timing for imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences and do not 
contain any language suggesting that the timing for imposition of the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing order should be different for the different 
circumstances. Instead, subsections (a) and (b) merely designate that the order must be 
made in circumstances where two or more sentences are ordered at the same sentencing 
hearing (Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1 )(a)) or at two different hearings (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(l)(b)); in either case, pursuant to section (1), the judge must include the 
consecutive sentencing order in the judgment. 
The dissent recognized that although subsections (a) and (b) do not address the 
timing for imposition of the consecutive/concurrent sentencing order, subsection (1), 
which applies to both (a) and (b), does address the timing and requires that the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made prior to judgment. 
Those subsections have nothing to do with the substance of the statute, 
which is that "[a] court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged 
guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses." Rather, subsections (a) and (b) are 
merely descriptive of the circumstances under which the statute may be 
implicated and do not serve to distinguish Jaramillo one way or another. 
Id. at ^19 n.l (citation omitted). 
In addition to not being supported by Utah statutes and case law, the majority's 
decision leads to illogical results. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, [^24 (Davis, J., 
17 
dissenting). While commending the majority for their concern over the "perceived plights 
of the trial courts, " the dissent points out that "nothing in the record refers to any 
difficulty which may be encountered when determining how much time a defendant 
should serve." Id at f25. This is so because the Board of Pardons has authority over the 
determination of how much time a felon will ultimately serve under Utah's indeterminate 
sentencing scheme and does not require guidance from the courts. Id. (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-5(1) (Supp. 2006) ("The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by 
majority decision when and under what conditions . . . persons committed to serve 
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases . . . and all felony cases . . . may be released 
upon parole. . . ."); see also Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, [^14; Bird, 2000 UT App 209 
(unpublished). 
As the Anderson dissent recognized, pursuant to Jaramillo and Utah's statutory 
scheme, "Judge Reese lacked authority to order Defendant's sentences to run 
consecutively. Rather, Judge Reese could only execute the suspended prison sentence 
originally imposed for Defendant's theft conviction." Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, f 18 
(Davis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Because the trial court did not have the 
authority to impose consecutive sentences following probation revocation, the decision of 
the court of appeals should be reversed. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Anderson, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the court 
of appeals' opinion affirming the trial court's imposition of his original sentence as 
consecutive to the aggravated robbery convictions he is serving in another case. 
SUBMITTED this [f^day of September, 2007 
\ 07U- ^ 6 / )^V 
JOAN C. WATT 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
C. BEVAN CORRY 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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THORNE, Judge: 
|^l Defendant David Scott Anderson appeals the district court's 
order imposing Defendant's suspended theft sentence to run 
consecutive to his aggravated robbery sentences. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[^2 On December 4, 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty to theft, in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-404, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-404 (2003), and Judge Frank G. Noel sentenced Defendant to an 
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. Judge Noel 
suspended the sentence and placed Defendant on probation for 
eighteen months under the supervision of Adult Probation and 
Parole. On August 16, 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to two 
counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah Code section 
76-6-302, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and Judge Judith 
S. Atherton sentenced Defendant to two concurrent indeterminate 
terms of at least six years imprisonment. 
%3 Adult Probation and Parole filed an affidavit with Judge 
Robin W. Reese, who had replaced Judge Noel as the judge 
overseeing Defendant's probation on the 2 0 03 theft charge. The 
affidavit stated that Defendant violated the conditions of his 
probation by having been charged with the offense of aggravated 
robbery. On December 6, 2 0 04, Judge Reese held a hearing to show 
cause, revoked Defendant's probation, and imposed the original 
sentence of zero to five years. Judge Reese ordered the theft 
sentence to run consecutively to Defendant's aggravated robbery 
sentences. Defendant appeals from Judge Reese's order. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1(4 In his appeal, Defendant claims that Judge Reese lacked 
authority under Utah Code section 76-3-401 to order his theft 
sentence to run consecutively to his aggravated robbery 
sentences.1 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003). This question 
is one of statutory interpretation, which we review for 
correctness. See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,^14, 127 P.3d 682. 
ANALYSIS 
1(5 Defendant claims that Judge Atherton--not Judge Reese--had 
the authority under Utah Code section 76-3-401(1) (b) to determine 
whether Defendant's aggravated robbery sentences would run 
concurrently or consecutively with his suspended theft sentence. 
Defendant asserts that Judge Atherton had the authority to 
determine the concurrent/consecutive issue because at the time 
she sentenced Defendant on his aggravated robbery convictions, he 
was deemed to be "already serving" his theft sentence due to his 
probationary status. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1)(b). Judge 
Atherton imposed Defendant's aggravated robbery sentences 
concurrent to one another, and Defendant argues that because 
defendant also asserts that Judge Reese's order increased 
his sentence, and therefore, violates the constitutional and 
statutory protections against double jeopardy. See U.S. Const, 
amend V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (1) 
(2003) . Defendant raises this claim for the first time on 
appeal. "'[W]e will review issues raised for the first time on 
appeal only if exceptional circumstances or "plain error" 
exists.'" Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47,1(39, 86 P.3d 699 (quoting 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994)). 
Defendant does not argue that plain error occurred or exceptional 
circumstances exist. Therefore, we decline to address 
Defendant's double jeopardy claim. 
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Judge Atherton imposed concurrent sentences that all other 
sentences should run concurrently to the aggravated robbery 
sentences. 
I. Interpretation of Utah Code section 76-3-401 (1) (b) 
1[6 Utah Code section 76-3-401(1) establishes the circumstances 
in which a court is required to make a determination pertaining 
to the imposition of concurrent or consecutive felony sentences. 
See id. § 76-3-401(1). A court must determine, when a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of multiple felony offenses, "(a) if the 
sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and (b) if the sentences before the court are to run 
concurrently or consecutively with any other sentence the 
defendant is already serving." Id. (emphasis added) . Pursuant 
to section (1)(b), a court must run the sentences before it 
concurrently or consecutively to another sentence if the 
defendant is actually serving another sentence. See id. § 76-3-
401(1) (b) . Therefore, we must determine when a defendant is 
deemed to be "already serving" a sentence for purposes of 
applying section 76-3-401 (1) (b) . Defendant asserts that at the 
time of his aggravated robbery sentencing he was already serving 
a sentence on his theft conviction because Judge Noel had already 
sentenced him and he was fulfilling his probationary term 
accordingly. In contrast, the State asserts that at the time of 
Defendant's aggravated robbery sentencing Defendant was not 
already serving his theft sentence because the sentence had been 
suspended and Defendant was not serving any of the prison term. 
%1 Interpreting the language "any other sentences the defendant 
is already serving" to exclude, as the State asserts, time spent 
while on probation is consistent with the legislature's use of 
the verb "served" throughout the statute. Id. In the balance of 
the statute served means incarcerated. See id. § 76-3-401. "In 
reading the language of an act, . . . we seek to render all parts 
[of the statute] relevant and meaningful, and we therefore 
'presume the legislature use[d] each term advisedly and . . . 
according to its ordinary meaning.'" State v. Tooele County, 
2002 UT 8,HlO, 44 P.3d 680 (additional quotations and citation 
omitted) (alterations and second omission in original) (quoting 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). 
%8 Throughout section 76-3-401, the legislature consistently 
uses the word served to mean incarcerated. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401. This is demonstrated in several subsections of the 
statute. See id. § 76-3-401(8) (" [D]etermining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be 
served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant 
as though he has been committed for a single term that consists 
20041095-CA 3 
of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms." (emphasis 
added)); see id. § 76-3-401(9) ("When . . . sentences are imposed 
to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently 
being served, the term that provides the longer remaining 
imprisonment[21 constitutes the time to be served. " (emphasis 
added))/ see id. § 76-3-401(10) ("This section may not be 
construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the 
validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length 
of sentences actually served under the commitments . " (emphasis 
added)). 
%9 Interpreting the language "any other sentences the defendant 
is already serving" to include, as Defendant asserts, instances 
where a defendant has already been sentenced, albeit suspended, 
would render the statute internally inconsistent. If the 
legislature had intended subsection (1)(b) to apply to suspended 
sentences, it would have substituted "already serving," id. § 76-
3-401(1)(b), with "has already been sentenced," id. § 76-3-
401(7) (c) , as expressly stated in subsection (7) (c) . In 
interpreting a statute, "the expression of one [term] should be 
interpreted as the exclusion of another [and that] . . . 
omissions in statutory language should 'be taken note of and 
given effect.'" Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 
110,^14, 993 P.2d 875 (citation omitted) (quoting Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217, 219 
(1973) ) . 
illO In subsection (7) (c) , the legislature expressed its 
intention to apply the aggregate maximum sentence limitation of 
subsection (6)(a) to defendants who have "already been 
sentenced." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(7)(c). Likewise, if the 
legislature had intended to allow a court to apply section (1)(b) 
to suspended sentences it would have used the same language 
articulated in subsection (7)(c) "has already been sentenced."3 
Id. The legislature's use of the language "has already been 
sentenced" in subsection (7)(c), should be taken note of and its 
2Imprisoned is defined to mean "sentenced and committed to a 
secure facility, . . . the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the 
person is located." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(12) (emphasis 
added). 
3A defendant fulfilling a term of probation has already been 
sentenced, but is not serving a sentence because the underlying 
sentence has been suspended. 
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omission in subsection (1)(b) should be interpreted as 
purposeful. Id. 
illl Reading the statute as a whole, we conclude that section 76-
3-401(1)(b) does not authorize a court to order a sentence 
concurrent or consecutive to another sentence that has not yet 
been both imposed and executed. See Thomas v. Color Country 
Mgmt., 2004 UT 12,1(9, 84 P.3d 1201 (stating that statutes should 
be read as a whole, and their terms construed consistently). 
When Judge Atherton sentenced Defendant on his aggravated robbery 
convictions, Defendant's theft sentence had been suspended. 
Since the theft sentence was suspended and the execution of 
Defendant's theft sentence was stayed, Defendant should not be 
deemed to be already serving the theft sentence. See id. Judge 
Atherton did not,4 and could not, order Defendant's aggravated 
robbery sentences to run concurrently or consecutively to his 
already suspended theft sentence. Rather, she correctly ordered 
that they be served concurrent as to each other, without 
referencing other sentences not yet being served. 
II. Sufficiently Definite Event for Commencement 
of the Consecutive Sentence 
[^12 Interpreting the statute as authorizing a court to impose a 
concurrent or consecutive sentence to a suspended sentence would 
create potential implementation problems. In the instant case, 
when Judge Atherton sought to impose the aggravated robbery 
sentences there was no sufficiently definite event for 
commencement of a consecutive order because it was not clear when 
or if the suspended theft sentence would be executed. However, 
any uncertainty or implementation problems are resolved when the 
concurrent/consecutive determination is reserved for the court 
seeking to execute the suspended sentence. 
^13 This approach is consistent with decisions from other 
jurisdictions faced with similar sentencing issues. The Oregon 
Court of Appeals in State v. DeChenne, 594 P.2d 831 (Or. Ct. App. 
1979), reversed a sentencing order that directed a sentence to 
4The dissent states that the record before us does not 
reveal whether Judge Atherton was even aware of the theft 
sentence. However, the record reveals that Judge Atherton 
ordered a presentence investigation report, which typically 
includes a section on the defendant's criminal history. The 
presentence investigation report was received prior to 
sentencing. Thus, it is likely Judge Atherton had knowledge of 
the theft sentence. 
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run consecutively to a suspended sentence.5 See id. at 832. See 
also State v. White, 481 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio 1985) (reversing a 
sentencing order that directed a sentence to run consecutively to 
a sentence that had not yet been imposed) . But see State v. 
Malcolm, 2003 Ohio 5629,11(17-24 (ct- APP • ) (treating a suspended 
sentence as being a sentence previously imposed and subsequently 
affirming a trial court order imposing a sentence consecutive to 
another sentence yet to be reimposed). The DeChenne court 
reasoned that "[t]he principal requirement in imposing a 
consecutive sentence is that there be a sufficiently definite 
event for commencement of the consecutive sentence in order that 
the Corrections Division may implement that sentence."6 Id. 
Kl4 Conversely, the circumstances presented to Judge Reese 
required him to make the concurrent/consecutive determination at 
the probation revocation hearing in which he sought to impose and 
execute the previously suspended sentence.7 Defendant, while on 
5State v. DeChenne, 594 P.2d 831 (Or. Ct. App. 1979), was 
superseded by Oregon Revised Statutes section 137.122 as 
recognized in State v. Smith, 767 P.2d 480 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
However, section 137.123 impliedly repealed section 137.122. See 
State v. Duran, 814 P.2d 182 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). 
6Although we agree with the DeChenne court's reasoning, we 
do not agree with the remedy imposed. See DeChenne, 594 P. 2d 
831. The DeChenne court reversed the county court's order 
imposing its sentence to run consecutively to a suspended 
sentence and remanded for resentencing. See id. On remand, the 
DeChenne court instructed the county court that it "may impose a 
sentence to run concurrent[ly] with or consecutive[ly] to the 
executed . . . sentence." Id. at 903. We believe that, under 
Utah's sentencing statutes, this approach would be error. The 
court executing the previously suspended sentence was the only 
court with authority to make the concurrent/consecutive 
determination. Therefore, a remand to the county court was 
inappropriate. 
7In Salt Lake City v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, we held 
that "the determination of whether two simultaneously imposed 
sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively is to be 
made at the time of sentencing, and may not be made for the first 
time upon the revocation of probation." Id. at %1G. However, 
the instant case is distinguishable. First, the trial court in 
Jaramillo failed to specify concurrent or consecutive terms for 
the two misdemeanor convictions before the trial court at the 
initial sentencing. Conversely, in the present case neither 
(continued...) 
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probation, incurred intervening convictions of aggravated 
robbery. And, at the time of the probation revocation hearing, 
Defendant was serving his aggravated robbery sentences at the 
Utah State Prison. Thus, in executing the previously imposed 
sentence, Judge Reese was required by section 76-3-401(1) (b) to 
determine the manner in which the theft sentence was to be served 
relative to the aggravated robbery sentences.8 As such, Judge 
Reese did not err in determining whether the sentences were to 
run concurrently or consecutively to one another. 
CONCLUSION 
1|15 Section 76-3-401(1) (b) requires a court to decide whether 
the sentence for any felony offense(s) should be served 
concurrently or consecutively to another sentence being served at 
7(...continued) 
Judge Noel nor Judge Atherton failed to expressly specify 
concurrent or consecutive terms; rather, it was not possible for 
either judge to make the determination at the time of initial 
sentencing because in both instances Defendant was not yet 
serving another sentence. Second, felony sentencing issues that 
involve circumstances similar to those in Jaramillo, where 
sentences are to be imposed for two or more charges at the same 
hearing, are governed by Utah Code section 76-3-401(1)(a). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (a) (requiring sentencing judge to 
consider "sentences imposed" relative to "each other"). The 
sentencing issue in the current case, where sentences are imposed 
in different cases by different judges at different times, is 
governed by section 76-3-401(1) (b) . Therefore, pursuant to 
section (1)(b), Judge Reese while executing the suspended theft 
sentence properly made the concurrent/consecutive determination 
pertaining to the aggravated robbery sentence that Defendant was 
currently serving. See id. § 76-3-401(1)(b) (requiring 
sentencing judge to consider sentences the defendant is "already 
serving"). 
8Defendant also asserts that even if Judge Reese had the 
authority to make the concurrent/consecutive determination, the 
record fails to demonstrate that the appropriate procedure was 
followed. Defendant raises this claim for the first time on 
appeal, and does not argue that plain error occurred or 
exceptional circumstances exist. "'[W]e will review issues 
raised for the first time on appeal only if exceptional 
circumstances or 'plain error' exists.'" Timm, 2003 UT 47 at [^39 
(quoting Ohms, 881 P.2d at 847). Therefore, we do not address 
this issue. 
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the time of the sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (b) . 
Because the statute, under subsection (1)(b), requires such a 
determination only when a defendant is "already serving" another 
sentence, it does not authorize a court to order a sentence 
concurrent or consecutive to a suspended sentence. Id. 
Moreover, an interpretation of the language "any other sentences 
the defendant is already serving" to include time spent while on 
probation is inconsistent with the legislature's use of the verb 
"served" throughout the statute to mean incarcerated. Id. We 
apply the statute in accordance with the previously articulated 
statutory interpretation, and hold that Judge Reese--not Judge 
Atherton--had the authority to determine whether the theft 
sentence and the aggravated robbery sentences were to be imposed 
concurrently or consecutively to one another. 
1)16 Defendant's theft sentence, although previously imposed, had 
been suspended prior to his sentencing hearing on his aggravated 
robbery convictions. As a result, Defendant was not already 
serving a sentence at the time of his sentencing hearing before 
Judge Atherton. Therefore, Judge Atherton did not have the 
authority to address, nor did she address, the issue of whether 
the aggravated robbery charges were to run concurrently or 
consecutively to Defendant's suspended theft sentence. On the 
other hand, Defendant was serving his aggravated robbery 
sentences at the time Judge Reese sought to execute Defendant's 
suspended theft sentence. Consequently, Judge Reese was required 
to determine whether Defendant's suspended theft sentence would 
run concurrently or consecutively to his aggravated robbery 
sentences. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Reese's order indicating 
that Defendant's theft sentence is to run consecutively with his 
aggravated robbery sentences. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
117 I CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
DAVIS, Judge (dissenting): 
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Hl8 In my view, Judge Reese lacked authority to order 
Defendant's sentences to run consecutively. Rather, Judge Reese 
could only execute the suspended prison sentence originally 
imposed for Defendant's theft conviction. Under the probation 
statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2006), the court 
imposing probation, in this case Judges Noel and Reese, has 
continuing jurisdiction over a defendant while on probation. See 
id. § 77-18-1(2) (b) (iii) . However, once the defendant's 
probation is revoked, such court is limited to executing the 
sentence previously imposed. See id. § 77-18-1(12) (e) (iii) ("If 
probation is revoked, . . . the sentence previously imposed shall 
be executed."). As such, once Judge Reese revoked Defendant's 
probation, the statute granted him authority only to execute 
Defendant's previously imposed theft sentence. 
fl9 Our recent decision in Salt Lake City v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT 
App 32, held that "once a defendant is sentenced and placed on 
probation, revocation of probation can result only in 'the 
sentence previously imposed [being] executed.'" Id. at |^12 
(alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e) 
(iii)). We then held that "the determination of whether two 
simultaneously imposed sentences are to be served concurrently or 
consecutively is to be made at the time of sentencing, and may 
not be made for the first time upon the revocation of probation." 
Id. at 1(16. While Jaramillo involved two misdemeanor 
convictions, the holding is in accordance with section 77-18-
1(12) (e) (iii) and is equally applicable to this case.1 Thus, I 
1While the circumstances in Salt Lake City v. Jaramillo, 
2007 UT App 32, vary from the instant case, our holding in 
Jaramillo is also applicable here because it relied on section 
76-3-401 of the Utah Code, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003), 
in order to promote consistency in sentencing. The majority 
attempts to distinguish Jaramillo by relying on the assertion, 
unsupported by the record, that Judge Atherton could not consider 
section 76-3-401; and then argues that a different subsection of 
76-3-401 applied to that case. According to the majority, 
section 76-3-401(1) (a) governs situations--as in Jaramillo--
"where sentences are to be imposed for two or more charges at the 
same hearing," and section 76-3-401 (1) (b) governs situations--as 
in the instant matter--"where sentences are imposed in different 
cases by different judges at different times." Those subsections 
have nothing to do with the substance of the statute, which is 
that "[a] court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged 
guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(1). Rather, subsections (a) and (b) are merely 
(continued...) 
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believe Judge Reese exceeded his authority when he imposed a 
sentence consecutive to a sentence for crimes that had not been 
committed when Defendant was originally sentenced, rather than 
executing Defendant's previously imposed theft sentence. 
i[2 0 Secondly, I disagree with the logic of the majority opinion 
respecting the effect of the authority of the trial judges in 
this case as well as the analysis of the scope of that authority. 
1(21 In a nutshell, the majority reasons that if Judge Atherton 
could not have imposed the robbery sentences concurrently or 
consecutively to the theft sentence, it follows that Judge Reese 
must have possessed that authority, notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 77-18-1(12) (e) (iii) . See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12) (e) (iii) . To reach this conclusion, it became 
necessary for the majority to find a way to rule that the theft 
sentence could not have been considered when imposing the 
subsequent aggravated robbery sentences. At this point, it is 
important to note that the record before us reveals only that 
Judge Atherton sentenced Anderson to two terms in the Utah state 
prison, those sentences to run concurrently with one another. 
The record does not reveal whether Judge Atherton was even aware 
of the theft sentence, let alone whether she took the same into 
consideration one way or another.2 Judge Atherton's case, in 
particular the propriety of her sentences, is not before us. 
[^22 Next, in order to relieve Judge Atherton of authority to 
consider the theft sentence, the majority opines that the theft 
sentence is not cognizable under section 76-3-401 of the Utah 
Code because the phrase "any other sentence the defendant is 
already serving," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1)(b) (2003), means a 
sentence served in jail or prison. In my view, probation is a 
sentence within the meaning of section 76-3-401(1)(b), and is 
still a sentence being served even though that service may occur 
outside of jail or prison. Probation is defined in the Utah Code 
as "an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or 
1(...continued) 
descriptive of the circumstances under which the statute may be 
implicated and do not serve to distinguish Jaramillo one way or 
another. 
2The majority underscores the problem with opining on the 
propriety of Judge Atherton's actions by speculating, with no 
record support whatsoever, about what a presentence investigation 
report "typically" includes, and further speculating that it was 
"likely" that Judge Atherton had knowledge of Defendant's theft 
sentence. 
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execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed 
conditions." Id. § 77-27-1(10) (2003). Under the Utah Criminal 
Code, a court may sentence an offender to, among other things, 
imprisonment, probation, or both. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(2) (Supp. 2006) (stating "a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: . . . (c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law . . . [or] (d) to imprisonment"). 
Similarly, federal law also treats probation as a sentence. See 
18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2000) ("A defendant who has been found guilty 
of an offense may be sentenced to a term of probation . . . ." 
(emphasis added)); see also United States v. Granderson
 f 511 U.S. 
39, 43 n.3 (1994) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
which "classified probation as a sentence"); United States v. 
Mueller, 463 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating "instead of 
representing the suspension of the execution of a sentence, 
probation constitutes a type of sentence in and of itself"). 
1(23 Moreover, probation is commonly understood to be a sentence, 
see Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
probation as a "court-imposed criminal sentence"), or the 
equivalent of a sentence, cf. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 793 
(Utah 1990) ("[I]t is unnecessary to determine whether a person 
who has been placed on probation incurs the punishment set out in 
the sentence prior to the time probation is revoked, because it 
is clear that simply by being placed on probation, punishment is 
incurred."). Additionally, in several contexts, a sentence of 
probation is handled consistently with a sentence of 
incarceration. See, e.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2) (stating 
that "[a] sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be 
stayed if an appeal is taken"). Since probation is a sentence 
that Defendant is already serving, Judge Atherton could have 
considered the theft conviction when sentencing Defendant for his 
aggravated robbery convictions. While I believe that Judge 
Atherton had the authority to rely on the theft conviction when 
determining whether the aggravated robbery sentences should run 
concurrently or consecutively to the theft sentence, it is 
inappropriate for us to opine in this case that Judge Atherton 
"correctly ordered" Defendant's aggravated robbery sentences to 
run concurrently to one another "without referencing" his theft 
sentence. 
1(24 The majority's definition of "already serving" may often 
lead to illogical results. For example, under the majority's 
view, a sentence that includes jail time as a condition of 
probation would implicate section 76-3-401(1)(b), but a sentence 
of probation with other conditions would not. It makes no sense 
that the almost infinite variations of probation would not 
implicate section 76-3-401(1) (b) , while a sentence for the same 
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crime that does include some form of incarceration would 
implicate the statute. Thus, under the majority approach, it is 
difficult to know under just what circumstances section 76-3-
401(1) (b) would be implicated: A sentence that includes 
community service? A sentence of confinement with work release? 
A sentence of confinement to jail and not the Utah state prison? 
Furthermore, the majority misapplies one of our canons of 
statutory interpretation when it claims that "[i]n the balance of 
the statute 'served1 means incarcerated." (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401 (1) (b)) . I agree that when "reading the language of 
an act, . . . we seek to render all parts [of the statute] 
relevant and meaningful, and we therefore presume the legislature 
use[d] each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary 
meaning." State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298,1)9, 99 P.3d 359 
(alterations and second omission in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 2006 UT 87, 568 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3. However, it does not follow that the term "serving" 
ordinarily means incarcerated. If the legislature intended 
section 76-3-401(1) (b) to apply only if a defendant was already 
imprisoned, it could have easily stated as much. 
1)25 Finally, in a further effort to support its theory of the 
case, the majority, showing commendable concern for its perceived 
plight of the trial courts, speculates about "potential 
implementation problems" created by interpreting section 76-3-
401(1) (b) "to authorize a court to impose a concurrent or 
consecutive sentence to a suspended sentence." However, nothing 
in the record refers to any difficulty which may be encountered 
when determining how much time a defendant should serve. For 
example, the Board of Pardons has the authority to determine when 
felons can be released and does not need guidance from this 
court. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1) (Supp. 2 0 06) ("The Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision when 
and under what conditions . . . persons committed to serve 
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases . . . and all felony cases 
. . . may be released upon parole . . . . " ) . 
1|26 In sum, I believe that Judge Reese had no authority to order 
Defendant's theft sentence to run consecutively to the sentences 
for Defendant's subsequent aggravated robbery convictions. 
Defendant's probation constituted a sentence, which would have 
allowed Judge Atherton to consider his theft conviction when 
determining whether Defendant's aggravated robbery sentences 
should run concurrently or consecutively to the theft conviction. 
Finally, I do not adhere to the majority's gratuitous discussion 
of the propriety of Judge Atherton's actions and its unnecessary 
discussion of "potential implementation problems." 
20041095-CA 12 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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THORNE, Judge: 
ill Thomas Max Jaramillo appeals from the trial court's order 
revoking his probation and reinstating his suspended jail time. 
We vacate the portion of the trial court's order that directed 
Jaramillo's sentences to be served consecutively. 
BACKGROUND 
1(2 On February 26, 2003, Jaramillo pleaded guilty to one count 
of burglary of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-204 (2003); criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, 
see id. § -106(1) (c) (2003); and intoxication, a class C 
misdemeanor, see Salt Lake City Ord. § 11.12.060. Four other 
misdemeanor counts were dropped as a result of Jaramillo's plea 
agreement. 
1|3 Jaramillo was sentenced on September 12, 2003. The trial 
court's written order imposed the following sentence: 
Based on the defendant's conviction of 
BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE a Class A Misdemeanor, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 
day(s)[.] The total time suspended for this 
charge is 315 day(s). Based on the 
defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a 
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 18 0 day(s)[.] The 
total time suspended for this charge is 180 
day(s). 
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 
year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 5 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0[.] 
The written sentence also ordered Jaramillo to complete fifty 
hours of community service, pay $1200 in restitution, and comply 
with enumerated conditions of probation. Jaramillo received 
credit against the burglary sentence for fifty days in jail that 
he had previously served, leaving 315 days suspended on that 
sentence. 
1|4 Neither the written order nor the transcript of the trial 
court's oral pronouncements at sentencing contain an express 
indication as to whether Jaramillo's two jail terms were to run 
concurrently or consecutively. The trial court did state at the 
sentencing hearing that "I'll impose 180 days jail [on the second 
count], suspend all of it and place you on probation for one year 
on that count, to run concurrently, the probationary term at 
least, to run concurrently with the other [probationary term]." 
^5 Jaramillo failed to comply with the terms of his probation, 
and the trial court revoked and reinstated his probation at a 
hearing on February 9, 2004. At that hearing, the trial court 
imposed Jaramillo's suspended 315-day jail sentence on the 
burglary conviction, suspending 255 days and ordering Jaramillo 
to serve sixty days. The court ordered that the sixty days be 
credited only against the burglary sentence. The trial court 
also imposed Jaramillo's 180-day sentence on the criminal 
mischief conviction, but suspended all of it. The court placed 
Jaramillo on consecutive probationary terms of three years on the 
burglary conviction and one year on the criminal mischief 
conviction. 
1|6 Jaramillo violated his probation again, and the trial court 
again revoked his probation on December 13, 2004. This time, the 
court imposed all of Jaramillo's suspended jail time, amounting 
to 255 days on the first conviction and 180 days on the second. 
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The court also ordered the two terms to be served consecutively 
for a total sentence of 435 days. 
1)7 Jaramillo objected to the imposition of consecutive 
sentences, asserting that his original sentence was for the two 
jail terms to be served concurrently. Jaramillo based this 
interpretation of the original sentence on an asserted 
presumption that a sentence is for concurrent terms unless the 
sentence indicates consecutive terms. The trial court rejected 
Jaramillo's interpretation, stating that "my understanding is 
that I don't have to make that election until I impose the 
sentence and I'll make that election today." 
%8 Jaramillo appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H 9 Jaramillo's sole issue on appeal is whether the trial 
court's imposition of consecutive sentences upon revocation of 
probation constitutes an illegal sentence when the original 
sentence failed to expressly specify concurrent or consecutive 
terms. Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law that 
we review for correctness without deference to the lower court 
ruling. See State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,1)9, 84 P.3d 854. 
ANALYSIS 
KlO Jaramillo argues that the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive sentences upon revocation of his probation 
constitutes an illegal sentence because it increases his original 
sentence in violation of his due process and double jeopardy 
rights. Jaramillo's arguments presume that his original sentence 
imposed concurrent terms, but the sentencing order was actually 
silent on the issue of concurrent or consecutive sentencing. 
1|ll We nevertheless agree with Jaramillo that the trial court 
improperly attempted to impose consecutive sentencing for the 
first time upon revocation of Jaramillo's probation. At 
Jaramillo's final probation revocation hearing, the trial court 
explained that "my understanding is that I don't have to make 
th[e] election [of concurrent or consecutive terms] until I 
impose the sentence and I'll make that election today." This 
represents a misstatement of the law, at least with regard to 
sentences that are originally imposed at a single sentencing 
hearing. 
1)12 "The trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke 
probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has 
discretion in these matters, the court's discretion must be 
exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith 
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v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990) . Accordingly, we look to 
Utah's probation statute for guidance as to whether a court may 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the first time 
upon the revocation of probation. Utah Code section 77-18-1 
provides that "[o]n a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court 
may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the 
sentence and place the defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 (2) (a) (Supp. 2006). Further, once a defendant is 
sentenced and placed on probation, revocation of probation can 
result only in "the sentence previously imposed [being] 
executed." Id. § -1 (12) (e) (iii) .x 
1l3 Utah Code section 77-18-1 distinguishes between "imposing 
sentence," which is a necessary prerequisite to probation, and 
"the execution of the sentence." Id. at § -1(2) (a) .2 Thus, our 
xUtah Code section 77-18-1(12) (e) (iii) states, in its 
entirety: "If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (e) (iii) . However, the "shall be 
sentenced" language appears to have been inadvertently retained 
by the legislature when it amended section 77-18-1(2) (a) to 
remove the suggestion that a trial court could place a defendant 
on probation without a sentence and suspend the sentencing 
decision until probation was revoked. See id. § -1(2) (a) (1999) 
(granting the trial court the authority to "suspend the 
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on 
probation"); Act of Mar. 5, 2003, ch. 290, § 3, 2003 Utah Laws 
1321, 1322 (amending section 77-18-1 (2) (a) to its current form) ; 
see also State v. Walker, 2002 UT App 290,111 n.8, 55 P.3d 1165 
(harmonizing prior version of section 77-18-1(2)(a) with the 
provisions of rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
In any event, section 77-18-1 now clearly makes the imposition of 
sentence a prerequisite to probation, and it is undisputed that 
Jaramillo had already been sentenced when his probation was 
revoked. 
2We are aware that the word "impose" has various common 
usages and is employed in sentencing contexts other than the 
initial imposition of sentence. See, e.g., State v. Todd, 2006 
UT 7,H|7-8, 128 P.3d 1199 (interpreting the terms "impose" and 
"imposition" as used in rules 22 and 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure); State v. Pizel, 1999 UT App 270,13, 987 P.2d 
1288 ("The court then found that Pizel had violated the terms of 
probation, revoked and reinstated probation, imposed a suspended 
sentence, and ordered Pizel to serve sixty days."); State v. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("At the 
hearing on the order to show cause, the plaintiff's probation was 
(continued...) 
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inquiry must turn to whether the determination of concurrent or 
consecutive terms of incarceration is a function of the sentence 
itself, which must be imposed prior to probation, or is merely a 
function of the execution of the sentence. Utah's sentencing 
statutes clearly indicate that the concurrent or consecutive 
determination must be imposed as a component of the sentence 
itself. See id. §§ 76-3-201 (2) (d) (Supp. 2006) (including 
"imprisonment" as an allowable component of a criminal sentence); 
-401 (2003) (discussing concurrent/consecutive sentencing as 
something that must be "imposed"). 
|^14 Utah Code section 76-3-401 is particularly instructive here. 
Although that section, by its own terms, does not apply to 
misdemeanor offenses such as Jaramillo's, see id. § -401(11), the 
terminology employed throughout the section indicates that, in 
both felony and misdemeanor cases, the concurrent or consecutive 
determination is one that must be made and imposed at the time of 
sentencing.3 Section 76-3-401 states that "[a] court shall 
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses." Id. § -401(1) (emphasis added). If 
a multiple felony commitment order does not state whether terms 
of incarceration are to be concurrent or consecutive, there is no 
presumption of concurrent sentences as Defendant argues,- rather, 
the Board of Pardons and Parole "shall request clarification from 
the court." Id. § -401(4). Upon receipt of such a request, the 
statute does not direct the court to decide the 
concurrent/consecutive issue anew, but rather to "enter a 
clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently." Id. This emphasis on 
clarification of the original commitment order indicates that the 
concurrent or consecutive decision must be made at the time of 
sentencing and may not be decided at some later date. 
fl5 There are also specific statutory factors that a court must 
consider in making its concurrent/consecutive determination, at 
least with regard to cases involving multiple felony convictions. 
See id. § -401(2). But see State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 
2(...continued) 
revoked and the prison sentence imposed."). We do not intend 
today's decision to define the word "impose" for all purposes, or 
to limit its usage in other contexts. 
3Even as Utah Code section 76-3-401 excludes misdemeanor 
cases from its purview, it makes clear that the 
concurrent/consecutive determination must be made at sentencing 
even in the misdemeanor context: "This section may not be 
construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive 
sentences in misdemeanor cases." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(11) 
(emphasis added). 
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651-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (applying section 76-3-401(2) factors 
to sentencing for one felony and one misdemeanor). The 
requirement that the consecutive/concurrent decision be made at 
the time of sentencing gives the trial court, the State, and 
defendants a fixed point in time at which to evaluate the 
statutory factors. It is noteworthy that, in this case, the 
trial court not only purported to impose consecutive sentences 
long after the written sentence was entered, but also made this 
decision, at least in part, based on Jaramillo's probation 
violations, which occurred after the original sentencing. 
i|l6 We hold that the determination of whether two simultaneously 
imposed sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively 
is to be made at the time of sentencing, and may not be made for 
the first time upon the revocation of probation. We need not 
reach the question of the meaning of Jaramillo's original written 
sentence, which was silent as to whether his misdemeanor 
sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. It is 
sufficient for resolution of Jaramillo's appeal that we vacate 
the portion of the trial court's probation revocation order 
purporting to impose consecutive sentences for the first time at 
Jaramillo's probation revocation, in violation of Utah Code 
section 77-18-1. 
CONCLUSION 
1|l7 It is clear that the trial court was purporting to impose 
consecutive sentences on Jaramillo for the first time at the 2004 
revocation hearing, which it may not do. We therefore vacate the 
consecutive aspect of the December 14, 2004 order, and remand 
this matter to the trial court for any further proceedings that 
may be necessary. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
[^18 I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
ORME, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
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1|19 I agree with the majority that the trial court was obliged 
to state, at the time of sentencing, whether Jaramillo's 
sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. I therefore 
have no problem with our vacating the imposition of consecutive 
sentences that the trial court tried to effect much later, in 
connection with the revocation of probation. I must dissent, 
however, from the decision of my colleagues to provide the trial 
court and the parties with no practical help about what this 
decision means for them. Because it was not stated at sentencing 
which way the sentences were to be served--consecutively or 
concurrently--does it follow that, by default, they are to be 
served concurrently? Or consecutively? Or do my colleagues mean 
to suggest Jaramillo's sentence was illegal and void? Or 
voidable? 
[^20 I assume they must believe it follows from vacating "the 
portion of the trial court's order that directed Jaramillo's 
sentences to be served consecutively" that the sentences 
necessarily must be deemed to run concurrently. Surely if 
something more far-sweeping were intended, like the conclusion 
that Jaramillo was never lawfully sentenced and therefore 
improperly served months of jail time, they would have said so. 
[^21 The difficulty with this position is partially made clear by 
the majority's own thesis: It is incumbent upon the trial court 
to expressly pick one or the other, concurrent or consecutive, 
when multiple sentences are imposed. Here, the trial court did 
neither at the time of sentencing, mistakenly thinking it could 
make that decision later. While it is intuitively attractive to 
assume that sentences are to run concurrently unless they are 
explicitly mandated at the time of sentencing to be served 
consecutively, such a default rule is, in my mind, no longer 
possible given that the Legislature rather recently rescinded 
just such a statutory presumption. See Consecutive Sentencing 
Act, ch. 129, § 1, 2002 Utah Laws 419, 419 (codified as amended 
at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003)). 
i|22 A layer of uncertainty is added by the majority's cryptic 
reference to remanding "for any further proceedings that may be 
necessary." The permissive verb "may" will no doubt be 
frustrating for the trial court and the parties. If the result 
of vacating the trial court's order that belatedly tried to make 
the sentences consecutive is that they just run concurrently, 
further proceedings on remand are simply not necessary. If my 
colleagues instead intend that the trial court is required to now 
specify whether the sentences run concurrently or consecutively--
a sound result given that there is no self-effecting default rule 
in place--then further proceedings on remand are manifestly 
required. But it must be one or the other. 
1(23 I simply am baffled at the use of the word "may, " as though 
the trial court is in a better position to know what this court's 
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decision means, and at the general reluctance of my colleagues to 
offer at least a modicum of guidance to the trial court about 
what, if anything, that court is supposed to do now. This 
disinclination to be helpful is especially curious in view of the 
oft-repeated and sound prescription, underpinned by 
considerations of efficiency and judicial economy, that appellate 
courts should offer guidance to trial courts on issues likely to 
surface on remand. See, e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C. , 2001 
UT 20,^22, 20 P.3d 388 (»[W]here an appellate court finds that it 
is necessary to remand a case for further proceedings, it has the 
duty of ' pass[ing] on matters which may then become material.1") 
(quoting LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 
P.2d 615, 617 (1966)); State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,^42, 52 
P.3d 451 ("Because on remand the issue [defendant] raises 
concerning consecutive sentences may again become germane, we 
address [defendant's] argument on this issue.") . See also Utah 
R. App. P. (30)(a) ("The court may also order a new trial or 
further proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is granted, 
the court may pass upon and determine all questions of law 
involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to 
the final determination of the case."). 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged 
to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when 
received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or 
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a 
judgment by a magistrate. 
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Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 77_01007.ZIP 2,435 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|AU Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Monday, April 30, 2007 
n/1 n i^r\r\n 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(hi) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
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(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(hi) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(hi) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
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A «n*rrod inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
sentencing. Any f ^ t ^ ^ ^ b y the parties and the department 
reportwhich havenot b e e n J ^ e a ^ P
 rf ^ s e n W n g 
pnor to sentencing s ^ ^ ° J & d m o n a l t e n working days to resolve 
i f g % ! ^ i c c u ? a c S ofthe report with the department. If after ten 
S S S r a c i e s c - be resolved, the court shall make a 
Tf^mfr, « tLi of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(STtZtfm!™ challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation reportVuhe time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
r v ^ A h ^ t i m e of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony evidence (7) Atthet imeot sente ,
 e c u t i n g attorney desires to present 
or Hxformat on ^ ™ 2 n t e n c e . This testimony, evidence, or information 
concerning the *V&0V™J***Z
 o n r e c o r d a n d i n the presence of the defendant. s
^5bxr0 nS «tion>the court may 
require that the defendant: 
u\ r,oT-fnrTTi 3Tiv or all of the following: , 
^D pa?! in^neo? several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
^ S V a i ' a m o u n t ^ r e q u i r e d under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
C
°(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liRnle* 
(iv)' participate in available treatment programs; 
v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
bv t S court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; . . 
(vH participate in compensatory service restitution programs m-
cluding the compensatory service program provided m Section 78-11-
20(vui) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
^ S r S a k e restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
J S L r t i n accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
^ ( ^ c o m p l y w i t h V e r terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and . , n n „ 
(h) if convicted on or after May 5, iyy/: , • , •, i „ J „ 
m ramDlete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
»t on S m a a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at he 
d l fendanSown expense if the defendant has not received the 
diplomaGED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
P l t S d p ^ r e b d t u m e n t a t i o n of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
CK) other justified cause. . 
(^ ThP department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by lection 76 3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
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(a) the parole period and any extension of tha t period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable, 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
war ran t by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court tha t the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated, 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court tha t authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe tha t revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
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(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
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(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2; 
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch. 
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3; 
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch. 
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3; 
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 103; 1997, ch, 392, § 2; 1998, ch. 94, 
§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7; 
2001, ch. 137, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 7; 2002 (5th 
S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment by ch. 279, effective May 3, 1999, substi-
tuted references to accounts receivable under § 
76-3-201.1 for references to fines, restitution, 
and other assessed costs under Subsection 76-
3-201(4) in Subsections (9) and (10); deleted 
"upon order of the court" before "shall collect" 
near the beginning of Subsection (9); added 
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the 
record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences 
the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is 
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court finds and states on the record 
that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from the court. 
Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as 
defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial 
sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to 
imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court or by a 
court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive sentences 
and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant 
as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed 
prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is 
considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the 
aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a 
sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes 
the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only 
to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive 
sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure correctional 
n/1 n nc\c\i 
facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or voided, and the person is 
not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
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TabE 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
Defendants TIMOTHY J AUKUSITINO, DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, RYAN 
DANIEL BINKS, JOSHUA FUNGALEI LOLOHEA, are linked. 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Charge 2 - 76-6-3 02 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Charge 3 - 76-6-3 02 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 4 - 76-6-3 02 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 5 - 76-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 6 - 76-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 7 - 76-8-306 - OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
Represented by: L BRUCE LARSEN 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
r\ /1 T /^r\r\>~r 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
Also Known As - " D-BOY " 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
Offense tracking number: 16109357 
Date of Birth: October 12, 1984 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: MIDVALE CITY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 04-003 095 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 04002456 
Sheriff Office Number: 0269968 
Violation Date: February 08, 2004 6885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 





















REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 





02-12-04 Judge PAUL G MAUGHAN assigned. 
02-12-04 Note: CASE FILED BY DET. ARGUETA OF MIDVALE POLICE DEFT IN JAIL 
WILL FAX WARRANT TO THE JAIL 
02-12-04 Case filed 
02-12-04 Filed: Information 
02-17-04 Note: Jim from Pre-Trial Services notified clerk defendant's 
Attorney Bruce Larsen request initial appearance of 2/19/04 
02-17-04 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on February 19, 2004 at 09:00 AM 
in Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
02-17-04 Note: Judge reassigned from criminal filing screen due to new 
procedure for roll calls. 
02-17-04 Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON assigned. 
02-19-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynettm 
Prosecutor: CHRISTENSEN, VIRGINIA O 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: DISK 43 Tape Count: 93232 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 02/26/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
02-19-04 ROLL CALL scheduled on February 26, 2004 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge MAUGHAN. 
02-19-04 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel filed by L Bruce Larsen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
02-19-04 Filed: Request for Discovery filed by L Bruce Larsen, Attorney 
for Defendant 
02-23-04 Note: Bail remain $250,007 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on March 11, 2004 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - W3 7 with Judge MAUGHAN. 
02-26-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, JOHN K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Count: off record 
HEARING 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
COUNT: off record 
Court Orders Case set for Preliminary Hearing 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/25/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W3 9 
Before Judge: BURTON, MICHAEL K. 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 3/11/04 
Reason: Counsel's request. 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on March 25, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Third Floor - W3 9 with Judge BURTON. 
02-26-04 Note: ROLL CALL minutes modified. 
03-04-04 Filed: FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
03-25-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on April 01, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - S41 with Judge MCCLEVE. 
03-25-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
HEARING 
The State's motion to continue is granted. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/01/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S41 
Before Judge: MCCLEVE, SHEILA K. 
04-01-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on April 22, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W4 6 with Judge LINDBERG. 
04-01-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lauraj 
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/1/04 Tape Count: 2:26:28 
HEARING 
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C/0 SET FOR PRELIM A/22/04: AT 2PM BEFORE JUDGE LINDBERG. COUNSELS 
ADVISED THE COURT THAT IS WILL BE A 3-HOUR SETTING WITH 8 WITNESSES 
AND 4 CO-DEFTS. 
04-07-04 Filed: letter from the defendant 
04-22-04 Note: Case Bound Over 
04-22-04 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on May 10, 2004 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
04-22-04 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified. 
04-22-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: DENISE P LINDBERG 
Clerk: valerieb 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
HEARING 
TAPE: 4/22/04 COUNT: 2:55 
witness' sworn 
COUNT: 2:56 
on the motion of the State, court ordered witnesses excluded 
COUNT: 2:56 
States witness Jose Argeta sworn and examined 
COUNT: 3:02 
States exhibit #9,10 & 11 MOA 
COUNT: 3:04 
State's exhibits 1 - 7 MOA 
COUNT: 3:14 
State's exhibit 8 <OA 
COUNT: 3:17 
Cross by Larsen 
COUNT: 3:20 




State's witness Ryan Binks previously sworn and examined 
COUNT: 4:13 






Cross by O'Connell 
COUNT: 4:33 
cross by Simms 
COUNT: 4:40 
state rests 
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COUNT: 4:40 
all defendant's advised of their rights and waive the right to 
testify 
COUNT: 4:41 
the court finds probable cause to bind this matter over 
the defendant was transported from the ADC 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 
5/10/04 at 8:30 AM in courtroom S44 before Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON. 
05-06-04 Filed: LETTER TO COURT FROM DEFENDANT 
05-10-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 9:08 
ARRAIGNMENT 
The Information is read. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/16/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/24/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/25/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
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Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 




Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
05-10-04 FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on August 16, 2004 at 08:30 
AM in Fourth Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 24, 2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 25, 
Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 26, 
Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
07-02-04 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing dated 4-22-04, 
Warnick, Court Reporter 
07-16-04 Filed: Third supplemental response to request for discovery 
08-16-04 JURY TRIAL Cancelled. 
Reason*. Case has been settled. 
08-16-04 SENTENCING scheduled on October 04, 2004 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
04 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
04 Charge 2 Disposition is Guilty 
04 Charge 3 Disposition is Dismissed 
04 Charge 4 Disposition is Dismissed 
04 Charge 5 Disposition is Dismissed 
04 Charge 6 Disposition is Dismissed 
04 Charge 7 Disposition is Dismissed 
04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 










Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 11:23 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Printed: 09/17/07 16:07:58 Page 7 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
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The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 10/04/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
10-01-04 Filed: RECEIVED PSR FROM APAP 
10-04-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 10:27 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COMMITMENTS TO RUN CONCURRENT. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
COURT RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR 23 9 DAYS TIME SERVED. 
COURT ALSO RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION AND 
TREATMENT. RESTITUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY BOARD OF PARDONS. 
Printed: 09/17/07 16:07:59 Page 8 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
10-13-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 325.50 
Q/1 
10-13-04 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 325.50 
Note: REPORTER FEES 
05-04-05 Note: SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT minutes modified. 
06-17-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
06-17-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
Printed: 09/17/07 16:07:59 Page 9 (last) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901010 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Date; October 4, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 12, 1984 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 10:27 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition; 08/16/2004 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/16/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT IAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
Page 1 
Case NO: 041901010 
Date: Oct 04, 2004 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COMMITMENTS TO RUN CONCURRENT. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
COURT RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR 239 DAYS TIME SERVED. 
COURT ALSO RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION AND 
TREATMENT. RESTITUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY BOARD OF PARDONS. 
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244128 (Utah App.), 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
Bird v. State 
Utah App.,2000. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Paul BIRD, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20000256 CA. 
June 29, 2000. 
Paul Bird, Draper, pro se. 
Jan Graham and Erin Riley, Salt Lake City, for 
appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Appellant Paul Bird appeals the denial of a 
petition for post-conviction relief. The appeal is 
before the court on a sua sponte motion for 
summary affirmance. 
Following Bird's 1995 conviction for Forcible 
Sexual Abuse, Judge Ray M. Harding sentenced 
him to a one-to-fifteen year term in prison. The 
court suspended the sentence, placing Bird on 
probation for thirty-six months. While on 
probation, Bird was convicted in 1996 of two 
counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child and one count of 
Distribution of Harmful Material to a Minor. Judge 
Lynn Davis sentenced Bird to two terms of one-
to-fifteen years on the sexual abuse counts and a 
term of not to exceed five years on the remaining 
count. Judge Davis ordered the terms to run 
consecutively to each other and to any sentence 
imposed by Judge Harding following probation 
revocation. Judge Harding subsequently revoked 
Bird's probation and committed him to serve his 
original sentence of one-to-fifteen years. 
Bird filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
UT App 209 
contending that Judge Harding erred in sentencing 
him to consecutive sentences. Bird misinterprets the 
relationship between his sentences. The consecutive 
sentences were imposed by Judge Davis. Judge 
Harding later reinstated the original sentence of one 
to fifteen years following probation revocation. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act bars any claim 
for post-conviction relief that "was raised or 
addressed ... on appeal" or that "could have been 
but was not raised ... on appeal."Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-106(l)(b) and (c) (1996). The Act makes an 
exception if "the ground could have been but was 
not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise 
that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel."/;/, at § 78-35a-106(2) (1996). The issue 
of consecutive sentences could have been raised in 
a direct appeal from the 1996 conviction and 
sentence to consecutive terms by Judge Davis. Bird 
makes no claim that the failure to appeal was the 
result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The trial court did not err in ruling that the petition 
for post-conviction relief was procedurally barred. 
However, the trial court also considered the merits 
of Bird's claims and determined that the sentencing 
court imposed consecutive sentences only after 
consideration of the factors enumerated in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). The court 
correctly concluded that the sentencing court did 
not abuse its discretion in sentencing Bird to 
consecutive sentences. 
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Bird v. State 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244128 (Utah 
App.), 2000 UT App 209 
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